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When Does A Minor’s Legal
Competence To Make Health Care
Decisions Matter?
Lois A. Weithorn, PhD, JD

In this article, I examine the role of minors’ competence for medical decision-making in
modern American law. The doctrine of parental consent remains the default legal and
bioethical framework for health care decisions on behalf of children, complemented by
a complex array of exceptions. Some of those exceptions vest decisional authority in the
minors themselves. Yet, in American law, judgments of minors’ competence do not typically
trigger shifts in decision-making authority from adults to minors. Rather, minors’ decisional
capacity becomes relevant only after legislatures or courts determine that the default of
parental discretion does not achieve important policy goals or protect implicated
constitutional rights in a particular health care context and that those goals can best be
achieved or rights best protected by authorizing capable minors to choose for themselves. It is
at that point that psychological and neuroscientiﬁc evidence plays an important role in
informing the legal inquiry as to whether minors whose health is at issue are legally
competent to decide.
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SUPPLEMENT ARTICLE

Questions about minors’ capacities to
make personal health care decisions
emerged in law and scholarship in the
1970s and 1980s,1,2 reﬂecting
a broader rethinking in society about
the legal status of children.3 In certain
groundbreaking cases involving
mental health and reproductive
health,4–6 courts held state laws
permitting unchecked parental
discretion to be unconstitutional.7 If
sole parental discretion would not
govern in these contexts, policy
makers and others wondered: would
minors be competent to decide for
themselves? These trends occurred
contemporaneously with the
evolution of the doctrine of informed
consent beyond its tort law origins,8
highlighting its bioethical grounding
in principles of autonomy and selfdetermination.9
Today, the doctrine of parental
consent remains the default legal and
bioethical framework for health care
decisions for children. Yet, the law
reveals a complex array of exceptions
to the doctrine.10 Each exception
provides for a decision-making
mechanism to supplement or, in some
cases, replace parental discretion. In
some instances, that alternative
mechanism supplants parental
decisions with those of the court. In
other instances, however, these
mechanisms authorize minors to
decide for themselves.
Every now and then, however, a case
comes to public attention that forces
us to think long and hard about the
contours of exceptions to the doctrine
of parental consent. Such is the case
of Dennis Lindberg.11 In 2007,
a county court judge in the state of
Washington allowed 14-year-old
Dennis to refuse lifesaving
transfusions on religious grounds,
ﬁnding the youth mature enough to
make his own decision.12 With
conventional treatment, Dennis had
a good prognosis for a disease-free
future. He died, however, shortly after
the court allowed him to refuse
treatment. Although a broad “mature

minor” rule does not operate in most
states, the possibility of future cases
like that of Dennis Lindberg
underscores the importance of
examining when the competence of
minors to make treatment decisions
matters in the law.
In American law, judgments of
minors’ competence typically are not
the sole or primary basis for a shift in
decision-making authority from
adults. Minors’ decisional competence
is rarely the star of the show. When it
is given a role to play, it is usually as
a supporting player. Typically, minors’
decisional capacities become relevant
only after courts or legislatures
conclude that the default of parental
discretion does not achieve important
policy goals or protect implicated
constitutional rights. Often the state
steps in and assumes decisionmaking authority from the parents.
Whether, instead, minors are legally
authorized to decide depends on
a range of policy, constitutional, and
practical considerations. Minors may
be legally permitted to decide about
one type of treatment, but not
another. Or they may be permitted to
consent, but not refuse, a particular
intervention. These discrepancies
do not typically demonstrate
inconsistent thinking about minors’
capacities to make treatment
decisions. They reﬂect the policy
goals underlying authority rules for
each type of health care decision.
Clinical and ethical considerations, in
contrast to legal rules, strongly
support involving children in health
care decisions.13,14 As I have written
elsewhere,15 there exist a myriad of
reasons to promote children’s
involvement in personal health care
decisions as partners with the legally
authorized decision-makers and
health care team.14 Independent of
legal rules, minors’ interests in
determining what happens to their
bodies and futures deserve some
weight. Bioethical analyses often
accord the interests and preferences
of minors’ increasing weight as

minors mature and their health care
decision-making capacities approach,
or are comparable with, those of
adults. In this article, however, I
conﬁne my remarks to identifying the
rules governing legal authority for
health care decisions for minors.

THE DOCTRINE OF PARENTAL CONSENT
Parental discretion is the starting
point for analyses of decisional
authority regarding children or
adolescents,4 and it is typically the
end point as well. The doctrine of
parental consent, which authorizes
parents to make most health care
decisions for their minor children, is
one expression of the broad,
multifaceted, and constitutionally
protected authority of parents to
make decisions affecting the welfare
of their minor children.16
There are at least 4 inextricably
interwoven rationales for this
parental discretion in child-rearing.
First, the family, as a unit, has
a special place in American society. It
is uniquely suited to perform the
social roles of procreation,
nurturance, support, and socialization
of children.17 Parental discretion also
protects against governmental
overreaching and promotes pluralism
and diversity, which reinvigorates our
democracy. Thus, protection for
parental decisional authority over
their minor children achieves
a myriad of social goals.10
Second, parental discretion is an
essential companion to the legally
enforceable duties of care and
protection of their minor children
that parents assume. Providing
parents with some measure of
freedom (within limits) in fulﬁlling
these weighty responsibilities is
thought to strengthen parental
commitment and investment.17
Third, most children have not yet
achieved adult levels of maturity in
a range of areas of functioning. They
depend on adults to meet their
essential needs.18 Although the age at
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which children typically reach
milestones characterizing adult levels
of functioning varies across
individuals, and depending on the
tasks in question, most children
require and rely on adult care,
protection, and guidance.18 The law
treats the generalization of minors’
incapacity as a legal presumption19,20
irrespective of its accuracy in
individual cases. The existence of
a bright-line rule facilitates day to day
relations among parents, children, the
state, and third parties.
Fourth, if minors are generally not
capable, parents are the logical ﬁrst
choice to serve as proxy decisionmakers.4 Parents are presumed to be
motivated to make and capable of
making decisions in their children’s
best interests.21 We further presume
that there exists an “identity of
interests” between parent and child,
that is, that the interests of parents
and children typically align and are
not in conﬂict.3,22,23
Although these 4 justiﬁcations do not
exhaust all of the rationales for the
doctrine of parental consent, together
they provide powerful support for the
current status quo. They also reveal
why policy makers are not overly
concerned that the bright-line, agebased division between minority and
majority often does not track minors’
de facto or actual competence for
particular legal purposes. Minors’
actual capacities are not usually
dispositive of their rights to decide.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF
PARENTAL CONSENT
A handful of exceptions to the
doctrine of parental consent exist.
Most, although not all, of these
exceptions exist because legislatures
and courts have determined that (1)
the state’s and/or child’s interests
outweigh those of the parents in
a particular context or (2) barriers
exist that prevent parents from acting
in their children’s interests in
accessing needed health care. Minors

may be authorized to decide
independently if policy makers
conclude it is the most effective way
to achieve policy goals or protect
implicated rights.
The law recognizes the state as
a partner to parents in raising
children. Government retains limited
authority to intervene in parental
decisions when it determines that
doing so is necessary either to protect
a child’s well-being or to promote the
general welfare. Thus, for example,
statutes mandating childhood
vaccinations before school entry seek
to achieve the dual purposes of
beneﬁting the vaccinated children
and protecting the public from
contagious diseases.24 Legislatures
and courts have determined that
these interests, in the context of this
high beneﬁt/low risk intervention,
outweigh parental interests in
exercising discretion.
The state also maintains oversight of
parental decisions on a case by case
basis. Civil and criminal medical
neglect provisions create a ﬂoor
below which parents’ failures to
provide for their children’s health
justiﬁes state intervention. Generally,
such intervention is conditioned on
a judicial ﬁnding that a parent’s
failure to access certain treatment
creates “a substantial risk that the
child will suffer serious physical harm
or illness.”25 Child maltreatment
statutes exist to vindicate the state’s
interest in furthering the well-being
of the child whose care is at issue for
that child’s own sake and for the
beneﬁt of society at large. The state
has a strong interest in fostering each
child’s transformation into a healthy
and contributing adult member of
society.
Some courts have considered minors’
interests apart from those of parents
or the state. They have held that
children have a “right to enjoy a full
and healthy life”26 through access to
standard medical interventions that
offer the opportunity to be free from

the harmful effects of life-threatening
and other serious diseases.27
Analyses of minors’ interests in
decisional autonomy have also
inﬂuenced modern law,5,6 although
minors’ rights in these contexts are
not generally coextensive with those
of adults. Some of these interests
have achieved constitutional status,
such as the rights of minors to make
choices regarding their reproductive
health.5,6
There exist various treatment-speciﬁc
exceptions that grant minors
independent (or in the case of
abortion, typically semi-independent)
access to a range of interventions.
State statutes, and occasionally case
law, frequently provide minors with
access to services related to
contraception, prenatal care,
abortion, outpatient mental health
and substance abuse, sexually
transmitted diseases, and sexual
assault. The rationales for such
exceptions include a complex mix of
constitutional, policy, and practical
factors that vary across the type of
health care involved. Yet, there are
many commonalities as well.
First, these treatments involve
sensitive matters that minors are
often hesitant to disclose to their
parents. Whether minors’ fears or
apprehensions about discussing these
matters with their parents are
justiﬁed, parents cannot facilitate
their minors’ access to treatment if
they are unaware of the problem.
Furthermore, a parent-child conﬂict
may exist if minors experience
parental opposition to their treatment
choice or reasonably fear negative
repercussions after disclosure of that
choice to parents.10
Second, with respect to most of these
exceptions, there is a broad societal
consensus and substantial scientiﬁc
evidence as to the beneﬁts to the
minors and society of facilitating
minors’ access to these services. For
example, there is widespread
acceptance of, and strong scientiﬁc
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evidence for, the premise that
preventing unwanted teenaged
pregnancy through contraception is
in the interest of sexually active
minors and also advances a range of
societal interests.10,28 Similar views
exist regarding the other treatment
categories listed above, with the
possible exception of abortion,
about which social attitudes remain
divided.
Third, constitutional, policy, or other
considerations elevate the
importance of supporting the minors’
decisional autonomy in some of these
treatment contexts. Most of these
exceptions are not propelled, in the
ﬁrst instance, by the goal of granting
minors decision-making authority
commensurate with their capacities.
Yet, our knowledge about those
capacities informs the question of
whether granting minors decisional
authority serves the identiﬁed
policy goals. Once the default of
sole parental consent has
been determined inapt for
policy or constitutional reasons,
determinations of minors’
competence move to center stage
because competence is a precondition
for legally valid consent.
The above analysis does not contain
an exclusive list of situations in which
the law might, and perhaps should,
give weight or authority to minors’
choices in health care, even over
parental objection. As minors
approach majority, courts may be
increasingly willing to allow them to
play a role in their own health in
contentious cases.29 Furthermore,
depending on the risk/beneﬁt proﬁle
of an intervention and the prognosis
with or without treatment, minors
may be authorized to play a greater
role in their own health care
decisions. Yet, importantly, inquiries
about competence tend to follow,
rather than lead, other steps in legal
determinations about who should
have decisional authority in
particular situations.

CAPACITY, COMPETENCE, MATURITY,
AND THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE
Capacity and Competence Standards
and Frameworks
The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study identiﬁed 4
standards of competence, one or
more of which are often used in
various health care decision-making
contexts: (1) ability to communicate
a choice, (2) ability to understand
relevant information, (3) ability to
reason about treatment options, and
(4) ability to appreciate the situation
and its likely consequences.30,31 In
California, for example, the statutory
deﬁnition of competence refers to “a
person’s ability to understand the
nature and consequences of
a decision and to make and
communicate a decision, and
includes…the ability to understand
[the] signiﬁcant beneﬁts, risks, and
alternatives [of a proposed
treatment].”32
Different standards and levels of
capacity may be required in different
situations, often depending on
various features of the decisionmaking context, such as the risk/
beneﬁt proﬁle and the consequences
of nontreatment. In some contexts,
consents and refusals are treated
differently. For example, in the United
Kingdom, there exists an asymmetry
in the ages at which minors are
permitted to consent to, rather than
refuse, treatment. This framework
permits minors aged ,16 who meet
the test of competence announced in
Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech
Area Health Authority33 to provide
independent consent for treatment.
But parents or the state can override
their treatment refusals. Minors aged
16 and 17 are presumed capable of
making their own health care
decisions. But if they refuse
a treatment that is determined
necessary to preserve their lives or
avoid serious harm, the minor’s
refusal may be overridden by their
parents or the court.34 Although some

have criticized this framework, the
policies reﬂect a social consensus in
favor of preserving good health, life,
and survival to adulthood while
respecting the minor’s developing
autonomy. This approach
demonstrates the various roles
minors’ competence may play,
depending on the social goals and
values a government seeks to
advance.

Psychological Science and
Neuroscientiﬁc Research Relevant to
Minors’ Competence
In the 1970s and early 1980s, relying
on then-available developmental
research, some scholars hypothesized
that minors aged 14 or 15 might be
able to satisfy legal standards of
competence to consent.1,35 Our
knowledge about minors’ decisional
capacities evolved in subsequent
decades, as scientists observed that
brain maturation continues into
adulthood.36 Scientists learned that
“psychosocial characteristics such as
impulsivity, sensation seeking, future
orientation, and susceptibility to peer
pressure” undergo such continued
development.37 By contrast, “the
ability of a person to reason and
consider alternative courses of
action” (core skills for effective
treatment decision-making) was
“found to reach adult levels during
the mid-teen years…”38
Psychological scientists, such as
Laurence Steinberg and Grace
Icenogle, have interpreted these
differential ﬁndings, distinguishing
between “cold” and “hot” cognition.
“Cold cognition refers to mental
processes (such as working memory
or response inhibition) employed
in situations calling for deliberation
in the absence of high levels of
emotion.”38 Generally during
circumstances characterized by
cold cognition, adolescents display
relatively unimpeded access to adultlike logical reasoning abilities, in that
emotional arousal is lower and peer
inﬂuence is minimized.39 “Hot
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cognition involves mental processes
in affectively charged situations
where deliberation is unlikely or
difﬁcult.”38 In these situations, factors
such as impulse control and
susceptibility to peer inﬂuence can
interfere with an adolescent’s use of
his or her reasoning and analytic
thinking skills.39 Some scientists have
pointed to a “maturity gap,” or
differential, in the points in
development at which individuals are
most likely to demonstrate adult-like
functioning on tasks invoking cold
versus hot cognition.38 In contrast to
decisions made in the context of
criminal behavior or regarding use of
alcohol or drugs, which are often
inﬂuenced by peers, medical
decisions typically occur in
circumstances “where the presence of
adult consultants and the absence of
time pressure impose sufﬁcient
external control to minimize the
dangers of impulsive decision
making.…”38 In light of the
cumulative body of research, various
groups of scientists have predicted
that minors would be capable of
making mature health care decisions
by adolescence. Yet, whereas some
predict that minors as young as 11 or
12 may manifest such capacities,40
others identify age 15 or 16.38
Empirical research focused on
treatment competence further
informs these questions.41,42
Weithorn and Campbell’s43 1982
study and investigations that
followed the MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study’s work have
incorporated assessment according
to the legal standards of
competence.44–48 Whereas some
research examined participants’
responses to hypothetical medical
vignettes in the laboratory, others
evaluated the capacities of minors
relative to their own decisions to
participate in treatment or clinical
research.
Those studies that have conducted
criterion-relevant assessments,(ie,
have tracked the applicable legal

standards) and have compared
minors with adults rather than to an
abstract (and possibly) idealized
benchmark have found no statistically
signiﬁcant differences between
adolescents aged 14 and older and
adults.43 Weithorn and Campbell43
studied minors aged 10 to 11, 14, 18,
and 21. They did ﬁnd statistically
signiﬁcant differences between the
youngest group and the 3 older
groups on most competence scales.
The research of Hein et al,44–46 which
included minors aged 12 and 13,
suggests that even minors in those
preadolescent and early adolescent
age groups can demonstrate adultlike competence according to the
MacArthur standards. A Canadian
panel of experts charged with
evaluating the literature for the
purpose of making recommendations
regarding the availability of medical
aid in dying to mature minors has
recently characterized the body of
research as follows: “Together, these
data point to the idea that cognitive
foundations for mature decisions are
generally in place by early adolescence
(12 to 15 years of age).”41

law principle that allows minors
authority to consent to or reject
general medical treatment under
certain circumstances.20,49–52 Only
a minority of states have adopted any
form of a mature minor rule, and
those that have demonstrate
substantial variation in the
parameters of that rule.51 States
initially adopted mature minor rules
to eliminate legal liability of health
care professionals treating minors in
circumstances in which parents were
unavailable or unwilling to
consent.50,51 In 1973, the late
Professor Walter Wadlington
observed that the cases to which the
rule had been applied generally
involved older minors (aged 15 and
older), who were considered to be
competent, and medical procedures
that were neither major nor serious
in nature.49 Today, the generic form
of the doctrine has not been widely
adopted.20,51 Yet it has sometimes
been expanded to situations in which
the treatment decision is both major
and serious.29 This is the doctrine that
Judge John Meyer relied on to allow
Dennis Lindberg to refuse treatment.15

Yet not all health care decisions are
the same. On the one hand, the
cognitive and psychological demands
of decision-making scenarios differ in,
for example, the complexity of the
disclosed information and the
difﬁculty of deciding among options.
Such variability could lead to
observed differences among minors
during the transitional ages of 12 to
15 years. Furthermore, the nature
and consequences of particular health
care decisions and the constellation of
interests involved may lead policy
makers to employ different standards
of competence or different thresholds
for determining when competence is
achieved.

The meaning of the term “maturity”
under these statutes and cases is not
always clear.51,53 Some statutes and
case law treat the term “maturity” as
synonymous with competence.54–56
This approach to maturity was
articulated, for example, by the Maine
Supreme Court in In re Swan, when
noting, “Capacity exists when the
minor has the ability of the average
person to understand and weigh the
risks and beneﬁts.”56

The Mature Minor Doctrine
The term “maturity” is sometimes
used in place of, or in addition to,
capacity or competence. The mature
minor doctrine is a statutory or case

Yet in some cases, judges have laid
out 2 sets of standards: the more
familiar treatment decision-making
competence standard and a broader
maturity standard that references
a host of social, emotional, and
psychological factors beyond such
treatment competence.57,58 For
example, the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Cardwell v Bechtol
considered “the age, ability,
experience, education, training, and
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degree of maturity or judgment
obtained by the minor…the conduct
and demeanor of the minor at the
time of the incident involved…[and]
the totality of the circumstances” in
addition to the standard treatment
competence factors.57 It is unclear
how an evaluator, whether a health
care professional or a judge, should
assess maturity when it is deﬁned by
such an extraordinarily broad and
open-ended list of factors.58 The
concept of maturity as a precondition
for independent health care decisionmaking by minors has existed in
abortion law for decades.6 Yet there is
no consensus about the meaning of
the standard. In fact, the inherent
malleability of the term “maturity”
has allowed it to encompass the
personal biases and preferences of
judges regarding access to abortion
for minors.52,59 Indeed, the broader
and vaguer the test of maturity, the
greater the likelihood that it will
serve a as a repository for unstated
values of clinical evaluators or
presiding judges. A narrower
and more speciﬁc standard of
maturity that can be more easily
operationalized is more likely to
provide a meaningful yardstick for
determining minors’ decisional
capacities. Yet application of focused
criterion-relevant competence
standards still requires those tasked
with evaluating minors’ treatment
decision-making competence under
applicable law to consider the
developmental science related to
psychosocial maturity discussed
above. In particular, one should
assess whether the circumstances
that facilitate the operation of cold
cognition are present. In any health
care decision-making setting, factors
that impair minors’ abilities to exercise
their logical reasoning and analytic
processes should be identiﬁed and
minimized to the extent possible.

CONCLUSIONS
Decisions about whether to allow an
older minor to refuse medically

recommended lifesaving intervention
present some of the most challenging
and emotionally wrenching dilemmas
in law, bioethics, and clinical practice.
In general, the law imposes a bright
line between minority and majority
for the purpose of authority to make
such health care decisions. Yet
occasionally such refusals fall within
an existing legal exception, such as
a mature minor rule. In other
instances, adults authorized to decide
under the law may, working in
partnership with (or in opposition to)
the treatment team, support a child’s
decision.
Although competent adults are
permitted to refuse their own medical
treatment for any reason, including
for reasons that others would
consider unwise, no such deference is
granted in American law regarding
health care decisions for minors. The
decisions of both parents and minors
(when the latter are permitted some
decision-making authority) are
subject to legal scrutiny based on the
policy goals discussed in this article.
When adjudicating cases in which
legally authorized decision-makers
refuse lifesaving treatment of minors,
courts consider factors such as the
relative balance of treatment burdens
and beneﬁts and the patients’
prognosis with and without
treatment. The state’s interests in
mandating treatment over the
objections of parents or a mature
minor diminish as the beneﬁts of
intervention become more elusive or
less certain or as the burdens of the
proposed treatment increase.
The Supreme Court of Delaware
demonstrated the importance of such
assessments in the case of Newmark v
Williams.26 In that case, Colin
Newmark suffered from Burkitt
lymphoma, described by the court as
an “aggressive and advanced form of
pediatric cancer.”26 The only
therapeutic option available to Colin
offered a 40% chance of temporary
remission, was described as radical,
and itself posed serious risks to the

child’s survival. In light of the
substantial treatment burdens and
uncertain beneﬁts, the judge declined
to order treatment over parental
objections. The case illustrates that,
just as parental discretion is not
absolute, neither is the state’s pursuit
of health interventions to safeguard
a child’s life.
On the basis of my review of
published court decisions, the ruling
in the case of Dennis Lindberg is an
outlier. In light of a “70% chance of
disease-free survival,”11 together with
the conventional nature of the
proposed treatment, most courts
would have ordered treatment over
the objections of Dennis and his legal
guardian. Although Colin Newmark
was a young child whose competence
was not at issue, the case offers an
important contrast. If Dennis
Lindberg’s medical prognosis with
treatment had been poorer, if the
risks of treatment had been greater,
or if there had been greater
uncertainty as to these factors,
Dennis’ (and his guardian’s) interests
in refusing treatment would have
been weightier in the standard legal
analysis. Furthermore, Dennis was
several years away from the cusp of
adulthood, a point at which some
lawmakers sometimes ﬁnd it more
difﬁcult to sustain the bright-line age
demarcation of adulthood.29 Despite
interjurisdictional variability, this
case stands apart from others with
similar fact patterns in vesting
decisional autonomy in a younger
adolescent whose prospects for
a healthy future with conventional
treatment were so bright.
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